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SUBSIDIES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FACILITIES 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY   
  
 
 
Abstract 
 
We derive the optimal investment timing and real option value for a renewable energy facility 
with price and quantity uncertainty, where there might be a government subsidy proportional to 
the quantity of production.  We also consider the possibility that the subsidy is retracted 
sometime subsequent to the investment.  The easiest case is where the subsidy is proportional to 
the multiplication of the joint products (price and quantity), so the dimensionality can be 
reduced.  Then quasi-analytical solutions are provided for different subsidy arrangements: a 
permanent subsidy proportional to the quantity of production; a retractable subsidy; a sudden 
permanent subsidy; and finally a sudden retractable subsidy.  Policy is considered certain only in 
the first case of a permanent per unit subsidy.  Whether policy uncertainty acts as a disincentive 
for early investment, and thereby offsets the advantages of any subsidy, depends on the type of 
subsidy arrangement.  The greatest incentive for early investment is an actual retractable subsidy, 
a “flighty bird in hand”.  
 
JEL Classifications: D81, G31, Q42, Q48 
Keywords: retractable or permanent subsidies, investment incentives, real options, renewable 
energy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
1 Introduction 
Do permanent or retractable government subsidies such as direct payments per unit revenue or 
per quantity produced, or specified feed-in-tariffs, or a renewable energy certificate or freedom 
from taxation, encourage early investment in renewable energy facilities?  Does the size of the 
possible government subsidy reduce the price threshold that justifies investment significantly, 
when both unit prices and the units of production are stochastic, if the subsidy might be 
retracted? 
 
The issue of the effect of government subsidies or charges on investment timing, when output 
prices are stochastic, is the original consideration in the first real option model of Tourinho 
(1979).  Tourinho poses the dilemma that without a holding cost being imposed on the owner of 
an option to extract natural resources, the owner would never have a sufficient incentive to 
commit an irreversible investment to produce the resource.  Other incentives to encourage early 
investment are the imposition (or presence) of an escalating investment cost, or as in Adkins and 
Paxson (2013) the existence of a convenience (or similar) yield for future prices of the 
underlying resource. 
 
There are numerous examples of government subsidies provided to encourage early investments 
in renewable energy, see Wohlgemuth and Madlener (2000), Menanteau et al. (2003), Yang et al. 
(2008), Blyth et al. (2009), Kettunen et al.(2011), Borenstein (2012), and Lapan and Moschini 
(2012).  IPCC (2014) emphasizes that “many renewable energy technologies still need direct 
(e.g. price-based or quantity-based deployment policies)…feed-in-tariffs, quotas...fixed price or 
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premium payments...guaranteed purchase.”1 Several authors have studied separate price and 
quantity uncertainty, and correlation in environmental problems, see Stavins (1996).  Pindyck 
(2002) and Pindyck (2007) use single factor real option models in addressing similar problems in 
environmental economics.  The nearest papers apparently to ours are Boomsma et al. (2012), 
Mosiño (2012) and Abadie and Chamorro (2013), but their solutions are either numerical (and 
often more realistic) or based on somewhat different assumptions and objectives, including 
capacity determination, and switching from non-renewable to renewable resources (see also 
Tahvonen and Salo, 2001).  
 
Wind farms in Spain and Portugal  have received different types of government subsidies 
including specified feed-in tariffs and investment tax credits.  In January 2012, some of these 
subsidies were retracted in Spain.  The Troika second review for Portugal in November 2011 
raised the issue of retracting similar subsidies, see EU (2011)
2
.  Domestically produced ethanol 
received both a direct subsidy in the US, benefitted from a tariff on imported ethanol, and also 
from EPA requirements regarding minimum quantities of ethanol in the gasoline mix.  Finally, 
governments in both Norway and Sweden have considered various types of subsidies for hydro-
facilities, see Linnerud et al. (2011). 
 
                                                 
11
 IPCC (2014), Chapter 7 page 72, and adds that “those that avoid unnecessary risks in project revenues are more 
effective.”  Similarly  BIS (2014) notes that “a key impediment to greater private sector funding [of infrastructure 
investment] is uncertainty about the pipeline of projects...private financiers will bear the fixed costs of building up 
expertise [for] projects that are not subject to cancellation or major revisions” (page 116).  These opinions are 
consistent with our Figure 5 regarding threshold triggers, but perhaps in contrast to Figure 11, showing that in some 
cases increased probability of a permanent or even temporary subsidy might increase the private real option value. 
2
 EU (2011) required Portugal to “review in a report the efficiency of support schemes for renewable(s), covering 
their rational, their levels, and other design elements [January 2012]…For existing contracts, assess in a report the 
possibility of agreeing renegotiating of the contracts in view of a lower feed-in tariff [Q4-2011]…For new contracts 
in renewable(s), revise downward the feed-in-tariffs. [Q3-2012]”, p. 118. 
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We use a Poisson (jump) process to model sudden provision of permanent or alternatively 
retractable subsidies.  Several authors have incorporated jump processes into real investment 
theory.  Dixit and Pindyck (1994) discuss Poisson jump processes, and apply upward jumps to 
the expected capital gain from the possible implementation of an investment tax credit.   Brach 
and Paxson (2003) consider Merton-style jumps in accounting for gene discovery and drug 
development failures and successes. Martzoukos (2003) models exogenous learning as random 
information arrival of rare events (jumps resulting from technological, competitive, regulatory or 
political risk shocks) that follow a Poisson process.  
 
We consider that the instantaneous cash flow from a facility is the respective commodity price of 
the output times the quantity produced, and either there is no operating cost, or there is a fixed 
operating cost that can be incorporated into the investment cost.  There are no other options 
embedded in the facility such as expansion, contraction, suspension or abandonment. Further 
assumptions are that the lifetime of the facility is infinite, there are no taxes or competition, and 
facility construction is instantaneous. Moreover, the typical assumptions of real options theory 
apply, with drifts, interest rates, convenience yields, volatilities and correlation constant over 
time, ignoring the seasonality and unreliability of prices and quantities.  Many of these strong 
assumptions may be required for an analytical solution.  Relaxation of some of these 
assumptions may lead to greater realism, but may then require much more complex analytical 
solutions or numerical solutions
3
.  
 
                                                 
33
 For instance, a positive or negative abandonment value would require another set of equations.  Possibly there is 
an alternative use for wind farms as a tourist attraction ( like on Wimbledon common), but more likely there is a 
decommissioning cost. 
  
6 
 
We assume the primary government objective of subsidies is to reduce the private sector price 
threshold (keeping the quantity threshold constant) that justifies making an irreversible, 
instantaneous investment, instead of creating a high real option value for any allowable 
prospective facility or concession. Initially we ignore the possibility that such concessions might 
be purchased from (and thus benefit) the government.  Also for convenience and comparison, we 
assume the probabilities of sudden provision or retraction of subsidies are equal, an assumption 
that is easily relaxed. 
 
The next section considers a broad menu of possible arrangements, that is some characteristic 
subsidies for such facilities, first where the subsidy is proportional to price times quantity, which 
is solved by simply scaling P*Q (Model I);  then assuming there is a permanent subsidy 
proportional to the quantity generated (Model II); then assuming there is a retractable subsidy 
proportional to the quantity generated (Model III); then assuming there is the possibility of a 
permanent subsidy proportional to Q (Model IV); and finally assuming there is the possibility of 
a retractable subsidy proportional to Q (Model V).  The third section compares the price 
thresholds and real option values using comparable base parameter values, and illustrates the 
sensitivity of these models to changes in some important variables such as quantity volatility, 
price and quantity correlation, the subsidy rate, the intensities of possible sudden permanent or 
retractable subsidies, and interest rates.  The final section concludes.  
2 Models 
2.1 Model I   Stochastic Price and Quantity 
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We consider a perpetual opportunity to construct a renewable energy facility, such as a hydro-
electric plant or a wind farm or another renewable energy facility (biodiesel, ethanol), at a fixed 
investment cost K . This investment cost is treated as irreversible or irrecoverable once incurred. 
The value of this investment opportunity, denoted by 1F , depends on the amount of output sold 
per unit of time, denoted by Q , and the price per unit of output, denoted by P
4
. Both of these 
variables are assumed to be stochastic and are assumed to follow  geometric Brownian motion 
processes (gBm): 
 d d dX XX X t X Z    (1) 
for  ,X P Q , where   denotes the instantaneous drift parameter,   the instantaneous 
volatility,  and dZ  the standard Wiener process. Potential correlation between the two variables 
is represented by  . It may be reasonable to assume the price per unit of output follows such a 
stochastic process if it is a traded commodity, while treating the amount of output generated per 
unit of time as stochastic may reflect the random nature of demand or supply. 
 
Assuming risk neutrality and applying Ito’s lemma, the partial differential equation (PDE) 
representing the value to invest for an inactive firm with an appropriate investment opportunity 
(based on perhaps approval for the facility or a concession for infrastructure) is: 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1
12 2
1 1
0.
2 2
P Q P Q P Q
F F F F F
P Q PQ P Q rF
P Q P Q P Q
     
    
     
     
 (2) 
                                                 
4
 Output could be electricity, biodiesel, ethanol or directly useful energies (like heat), each of which are likely to 
follow somewhat different diffusion processes.  Sometimes these specific diffusion processes will not enable 
analytical solutions, see Mosiño (2012).  Note gBm may not be appropriate for modeling electricity prices, which 
may be mean-reverting, so solutions using the Kummer function as shown in Dockendorf and Paxson (2010) may be 
required. 
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where X  denote the risk-neutral drift rates and r  the risk-free rate, (=r-)
5
. Following 
McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Adkins and Paxson (2011), the solution to (2) is: 
 1 11 1F A P Q
  . (3) 
1  and 1  are the power parameters for this option value function. Since there is an incentive to 
invest when both P  and Q  are sufficiently high but a disincentive when either are sufficiently 
low, we would expect both power parameter values to be positive. Also, the parameters are 
linked through the characteristic root equation found by substituting (3) in (2): 
      2 21 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 2, 1 1 0P Q P Q P QQ r                       . (4) 
 
We assume that there is no operational flexibility once the investment to construct the plant has 
been made. After the investment, the plant generates revenue equaling (1+)* PQ , where  is the 
permanent subsidy proportional to the revenue sold (=0 indicates no possible subsidy).  So from 
(2), the valuation relationship for the operational state is: 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1
12 2
1 1
(1 ) 0
2 2
P Q P Q P Q
F F F F F
P Q PQ P Q PQ rF
P Q P Q P Q
      
    
       
     
, (5) 
where we ignore the operating cost, which is assumed to be mainly fixed and treated as a 
constant. After the investment (K), the solution to (5) is: 
 
(1 )
PQ
PQ
r




, 
where 
PQ P Q P Q       , see Paxson and Pinto (2005). The investment is made when the 
two variables attain their respective thresholds. If we denote the threshold levels for P  and Q  by 
                                                 
5
 In sensitivity analysis, we assume s are not affected by changes in the specific parameter value considered. 
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1Pˆ  and 1Qˆ , respectively, and since value conservation requires the investment option value to be 
exactly balanced by the net value rendered by the investment, then the value matching 
relationship is specified by: 
 1 1 1 11 1
ˆˆ(1 )ˆˆ
PQ
PQ
AP Q K
r
  


 

. (6) 
Optimality is characterized by the two smooth pasting conditions associated with (6)  for P and 
Q  , respectively: 
 1 1 1 11 1 1
ˆˆ(1 )ˆˆ
PQ
PQ
AP Q
r
  




, (7) 
 1 1 1 11 1 1
ˆˆ(1 )ˆˆ
PQ
PQ
AP Q
r
  




. (8) 
From (7) and (8), our conjecture that the parameter values are positive is corroborated because of 
the non-negativity of the investment option value. Moreover, the parameters are equal, 1 1  . 
This establishes that for determining the optimal investment policy, the two factors can be 
simply represented by their product PQ , the revenue from generating output per unit of time. 
This substitution is originally proposed by Paxson and Pinto (2005), who apply the principle of 
similarity for reducing the dimension of (5) to one in order to obtain a closed-form solution. It 
follows that: 
 1 1 1
1
ˆˆ(1 )
1PQ
PQ
K
r
 
 


 
, (9) 
where 1  is determined from  1 1, 0Q    , (4). Also 
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1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1
ˆˆfor ,
(1 ) ˆˆfor .
PQ
A P Q PQ PQ
F PQ
K PQ PQ
r
 


 

 
  
 (10) 
with: 
 
1 11 1
1 1
1
1
ˆˆ(1 )
( )PQ
P Q
A
r
 
 
 


. 
 
2.2 Model II    
Stochastic Price and Quantity  with a Permanent Subsidy on Quantity 
We now modify the analysis to consider the impact on the investment decision of a permanent 
government subsidy, denoted by  , whose value is proportional to the amount of output Q sold 
per unit of time.   In the presence of the subsidy, the generating plant is effectively producing 
two distinct outputs: (i) the revenue per unit of time generated by the plant PQ , and (ii) the 
subsidy revenue received from the government or power customers Q . As before, the 
investment option value denoted by 2F  depends on the two factors P  and Q . The risk neutral 
valuation relationship for 2F  takes a similar form as (2), so the valuation function is given by (3) 
except for the change in subscript, that is 2 2
2 2F A P Q
  . Also, its characteristic root equation is 
 2 2, 0Q    , (4). 
 
After incurring the investment, the present value of the operating revenue for the plant is: 
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PQ Q
PQ Q
r r

 

 
. 
The operating revenue is the present value of the operating revenue plus the government subsidy. 
If the two threshold levels signaling optimal investment are denoted by 
2Pˆ  and 2Qˆ  for P  and Q , 
respectively, then the value matching relationship for this subsidized production model is: 
 2 2 2 2 22 2 2
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆˆ
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q K
r r
  
 
  
 
. (11) 
It is observable from (11) that the principle of similarity is no longer available, since the factors 
P  and Q  occurring in the relationship cannot be construed as a product PQ , even if 2 2  . 
The two smooth pasting conditions associated with (11) are: 
 2 2 2 22 2 2 2
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
PQ
P Q
A P Q
r
 



, (12) 
 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆˆ
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q
r r
  
 
 
 
. (13) 
These conditions, (12) and (13),  reveal that both 2  and 2  are positive, otherwise the option 
value at investment 2 2
2 2 2
ˆˆA P Q   would be negative. Moreover, by simplifying we have: 
 2 2
2 2
ˆ
PQ Q
P
r r
 
   

  
, 
which establishes that 2  exceeds 2  provided the subsidy rate   is positive.  We obtain 
reduced form value matching relationships by substituting (12) and (13) in (11), respectively: 
 2 2 2 2
2
ˆ ˆˆ
1PQ Q
P Q Q
K
r r
 
  
 
      
, (14) 
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 2 2 2 2
2
ˆ ˆˆ
1PQ Q
P Q Q
K
r r
 
  
 
  
.   (15) 
In these reduced forms, the government subsidy effectively reduces the effective investment cost 
of the plant with the economic consequence that the optimal revenue threshold justifying the 
investment is lower than without it. 
 
The thresholds for the output sold per unit of time Q  and the price per unit of output P  
economically justifying an optimal investment are specified by the two reduced form value 
matching relationships, (14) and (15), and (4) the characteristic root equation  2 2, 0Q    . In 
principle, the boundary relationship is obtainable by eliminating 2  and 2 from the three 
constituent equations, but as no purely analytical solution exists, we resort to obtaining the 
boundary numerically, solving sets of equations simultaneously. 
 
2.3 Model III    
Stochastic Price and Quantity with a Retractable Subsidy on Quantity  
Subsidies are normally offered by governments in order to induce entrepreneurs to accelerate the 
timing of their investment in facilities, when otherwise they would defer making their 
commitment. As soon as the subsidy has activated sufficient plant investment, the government 
may decide to withdraw the subsidy, often without any advance warning. We now explore the 
financial consequences on the investment decision for a subsidy that can be withdrawn at any 
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time and to determine its effects on the threshold levels for P  and Q .  We assume that once the 
subsidy is withdrawn, it will never again be provided. 
 
We denote the value of the investment option in the presence of a subsidy, but when there is a 
possibility of an immediate withdrawal, by 3F , and in the absence of a subsidy by 1F (when =0), 
as before. We assume that the subsidy withdrawal is well explained by a Poisson process with a 
constant intensity factor, denoted by . The change in the option value conditional on the 
subsidy withdrawal occurring is    1 3, ,F P Q F P Q , so the expected change is given by: 
             1 3 1 3, , d 0 1 d , , dF P Q F P Q t t F P Q F P Q t       . 
From (2), it follows that the risk-neutral valuation relationship for 3F  is: 
 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 23 3 3
2 2
3 3
1 3
1 1
2 2
0.
P Q P Q
P Q
F F F
P Q PQ
P Q P Q
F F
P Q F r F
P Q
   
   
  
 
   
 
     
 
 (16) 
The solution to (16) adopts the form: 
 3 3 1 1
3 3 1F A P Q A P Q
     , (17) 
where the parameters 1  and 1  are specified by  1 1, 0Q    , (4), with 1 1  (with =0), 
while 3  and 3  are related through the characteristic root equation: 
 
     
 
2 21 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2
3 3
, 1 1
0.
P Q P Q
P Q
Q
r
           
    
    
    
 (18) 
For any feasible values of P  and Q , the valuation function 3F  exceeds 1F  because the 
coefficient 3A  is positive. This implies that the option value to invest is always greater in the 
presence of a government subsidy that may be withdrawn unexpectedly than in its absence, 
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which suggests that a subsidy, even one having an unexpected withdrawal, comparatively 
hastens the investment commitment, while it is comparatively deferred in its absence. 
 
If the subsidy is present, then the present value of the plant is    PQ QPQ r Q r     , and 
if absent, then  PQPQ r  , so the net present value after the investment is: 
 
 1
PQ Q
QPQ
r r
 
 


 
. 
The thresholds signaling investment for a subsidy with unexpected withdrawal are denoted by 
3Pˆ   
and 
3Qˆ  for P  and Q , respectively. The value matching condition becomes: 
 
 
3 3 1 1 33 3
3 3 3 1 3 3
ˆˆˆ 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
PQ Q
QPQ
A P Q A P Q K
r r
     
 

   
 
. (19) 
The two associated smooth pasting conditions are, respectively: 
 3 3 1 1 3 33 3 3 3 1 1 3 3
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
PQ
PQ
A P Q A P Q
r
    

 

, (20) 
 
 
3 3 1 1 33 3
3 3 3 3 1 1 3 3
ˆˆˆ 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
PQ Q
QPQ
A P Q A P Q
r r
      
 

  
 
. (21) 
The parameter values 1A , 1  and 1  are known from the solution to Model I with =0. 
3 31 1 3 3
3 1 1 3 3 3 3 3
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) / ( )
PQ
PQ
A A P Q P Q
r
   

  

      
The Appendix contains the equivalent models based on revenue and simplified analytical 
solutions for Models I, II and III, which might also be useful in deriving partial derivatives 
analytically. 
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2.4 Model IV   Stochastic Joint Products with Sudden Provision of a                        
Permanent Subsidy on Quantities 
We now explore the financial consequences on the investment decision for a subsidy that can be 
provided permanently at any time, in order to determine its effects on the threshold levels for P  
and Q .  We consider now only the case where the subsidy thereafter can never be withdrawn, 
and compare the case of building the facility without a possible subsidy with the cases of a 
permanent subsidy.   
 
Since a sudden unexpected subsidy withdrawal makes an operating plant appear to be less 
economically attractive, it is likely that investment is hastened to capture the subsidy before it is 
withdrawn. In contrast, a sudden unexpected permanent subsidy introduction is expected to 
produce the opposite effect of investment deferral so that the subsidy income can be more fully 
captured. 
 
In Model II, the revenue threshold that signals an economically justified investment in the 
presence of a subsidy is 
2 2 2
ˆˆ ˆR P Q . Before the investment is made, the threshold 2Rˆ  creates 
either side separate domains over which the investment option value differs in form.  The 
prevailing revenue is denoted by R PQ . If the prevailing revenue R  is less than the threshold 
2Rˆ , then a sudden unexpected subsidy announcement does not trigger an immediate investment 
and the investment is deferred until R  attains 
2Rˆ . If, on the other hand, 2
ˆR R , then a sudden 
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unexpected subsidy announcement automatically triggers an immediate investment in the plant. 
This asymmetry around the threshold 
2Rˆ  means that the investigation of a sudden unexpected 
subsidy announcement has to treat the case where 
2
ˆR R  differently from where 2
ˆR R .  
 
The value for the investment option, denoted by 4F , is specified over the two domains: 
 
40 2
4
41 2
ˆfor ,
ˆfor .
F R R
F
F R R
 
 

 (22) 
We first consider the domain 
2
ˆR R , which is considered to be below threshold because over 
this domain, in the presence of a subsidy investment is not economically justified. It is assumed 
that a subsidy introduction is well described by a Poisson process with intensity  , and that once 
introduced, it cannot be withdrawn. The risk neutral valuation relationship then becomes: 
 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 240 40 40
2 2
40 40
2 40
1 1
2 2
0.
P Q P Q
P Q
F F F
P Q PQ
P Q P Q
F F
P Q F r F
P Q
   
   
  
 
   
 
     
 
 (23) 
The solution to (23) adopts the form: 
 40 40 2 2
40 40 2F A P Q A P Q
      (24) 
where the parameters 2  and 2  are specified by  2 2, 0Q    , (4), and 40  and 40  by 
 3 40 40, 0Q    , (18).  
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If there is no subsidy, then the present value of the plant is given by  PQPQ r  , while if there 
is an additional subsidy, then the present value is    PQ QPQ r Q r     . The net operating 
present value after the investment is given by: 
 
PQ Q
PQ Q
r r

 

 
. 
The thresholds signaling investment for a sudden unexpected subsidy introduction are denoted 
by 
40Pˆ   and 40Qˆ  for P  and Q , respectively. The value matching condition becomes: 
 40 40 2 2 40 40 4040 40 40 2 40 40
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q A P Q K
r r
    
 
   
 
. (25) 
The two associated smooth pasting conditions can be expressed as, respectively: 
 40 40 2 2 40 4040 40 40 40 2 2 40 40
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ,
PQ
P Q
A P Q A P Q
r
    

 

 (26) 
 40 40 2 2 40 40 4040 40 40 40 2 2 40 40
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ .
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q A P Q
r r
     
 
  
 
 (27) 
 
We now consider the domain 
2
ˆR R , where investment is justified if the subsidy is introduced.  
The risk neutral valuation relationship for this domain is: 
 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 241 41 41
2 2
41 41
2 41
1 1
2 2
ˆ 0.
P Q P Q
P Q
F F F
P Q PQ
P Q P Q
F F
P Q F r F
P Q
   
   
  
 
   
 
     
 
 (28) 
When an unexpected subsidy is announced for 
2
ˆR R , the option valuation function 
instantaneously changes from 41F  into 
2 2
2 2 2 2
ˆˆ ˆF A P Q  , which denotes the threshold option value 
for committing an investment in the presence of a subsidy. The solution to (28) is: 
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 41 41 2 241 41 2 2 2
ˆˆF A P Q A P Q
r
   

 

, (29) 
where the parameters 2  and 2  are specified by  2 2, 0Q    , (4), and 41  and 41  by 
 3 41 41, 0Q    , (18).  
 
The thresholds signaling investment for a sudden unexpected subsidy introduction are denoted 
by 
41Pˆ   and 41Qˆ  for P  and Q , respectively. The value matching condition becomes: 
 41 41 2 2 41 41 4141 41 41 2 2 2
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q A P Q K
r r r
    
  
   
  
. (30) 
The two associated smooth pasting conditions can be expressed as, respectively: 
 41 41 41 4141 41 41 41
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
PQ
P Q
A P Q
r
 



, (31) 
 41 41 41 41 4141 41 41 41
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆˆ
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q
r r
  
 
 
 
. (32) 
 
The reduced form value matching relationships are obtained by substituting (31) and (32) in (30), 
respectively, to give: 
 2 241 41 41 41
2 2 2
41
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆˆ
1PQ Q
P Q Q
K A P Q
r r r
  
   
 
   
     
, (33) 
 2 241 41 41 412 2 2
41
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆˆ
1PQ Q
P Q Q
K A P Q
r r r
  
   
 
       
. (34) 
It is observed from (33) and (34) that the effect of an unexpected sudden subsidy introduction is 
to raise the effective investment cost by an amount equaling the option value for an economically 
justified investment in the presence of a subsidy, adjusted by the Poisson intensity parameter  . 
  
19 
 
For 0  , the solution simplifies to the case of no subsidy. As   becomes increasingly large, 
the effective investment cost is raised by the amount equaling the option value.   
 
2.5 Model V  Stochastic Joint Products with Sudden Provision of a 
Retractable  Subsidy  
Finally, we consider the case where a government suddenly provides a retractable subsidy, but 
only for those facilities built after the announcement of the subsidy provision.  Since a sudden 
unexpected subsidy withdrawal makes an operating plant appear to be less economically 
attractive, there is the incentive to capture the subsidy before it is withdrawn, but also the 
obvious incentive to wait until the retractable subsidy is available. 
  
In Model III, the revenue threshold that signals an economically justified investment in the 
presence of a retractable subsidy is 
3 3 3
ˆˆ ˆR PQ . Before the investment is made, the threshold 3Rˆ  
creates either side separate domains over which the investment option value differs in form.  The 
prevailing revenue is denoted by R PQ . If the prevailing revenue R  is less than the threshold 
3Rˆ , then a sudden unexpected subsidy announcement does not trigger an immediate investment 
and the investment is deferred until R  attains 
3Rˆ . If, on the other hand, 3
ˆR R , then a sudden 
unexpected subsidy announcement automatically triggers an immediate investment in the plant. 
This asymmetry around the threshold 
3Rˆ  means that the investigation of a sudden unexpected 
subsidy announcement has to treat the case where 
3
ˆR R  differently from where 3
ˆR R .  
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The value for the investment option, denoted by 5F , is specified over the two domains: 
 
50 3
5
51 3
ˆfor ,
ˆfor .
F R R
F
F R R
 
 

 (35) 
We first consider the domain 
3
ˆR R , which is considered to be below the threshold  because 
over this domain, investment in the presence of a retractable subsidy is not economically 
justified. It is assumed that a subsidy introduction is well described by a Poisson process with 
intensity  , and that once introduced, it is retractable. The risk neutral valuation relationship 
then becomes: 
 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 250 50 50
2 2
50 50
3 50
1 1
2 2
0.
P Q P Q
P Q
F F F
P Q PQ
P Q P Q
F F
P Q F r F
P Q
   
   
  
 
   
 
     
 
 (36) 
The solution to (36) adopts the form: 
 50 50 3 3
50 50 3F A P Q A P Q
      (37) 
where the parameters 3  and 3  are specified by  3 3, 0Q    , (18), and 50  and 50  by 
 3 50 50, 0Q    , (18). 
The thresholds signaling investment for a sudden unexpected subsidy introduction are denoted 
by 
50Pˆ   and 50Qˆ  for P  and Q , respectively. The value matching condition becomes: 
 50 50 3 3 50 50 5050 50 50 3 50 50
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q A P Q K
r r
    
 
   
 
. (38) 
The two associated smooth pasting conditions can be expressed as, respectively: 
 50 50 3 3 50 5050 50 50 50 3 3 50 50
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ,
PQ
P Q
A P Q A P Q
r
    

 

 (39) 
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 50 50 3 3 50 50 5050 50 50 50 3 3 50 50
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ .
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q A P Q
r r
     
 
  
 
 (40) 
We now consider the domain 
3
ˆR R , where investment is justified if the retractable subsidy is 
introduced.  The risk neutral valuation relationship for this domain is: 
 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 251 51 51
2 2
51 51
3 51
1 1
2 2
ˆ 0.
P Q P Q
P Q
F F F
P Q PQ
P Q P Q
F F
P Q F r F
P Q
   
   
  
 
   
 
     
 
 (41) 
When an unexpected subsidy is announced for 
3
ˆR R , the option valuation function 
instantaneously changes from 51F  into 
3 3
3 3 3 3
ˆˆ ˆF A P Q  , which denotes the threshold option value 
for committing an investment in the presence of a subsidy. The solution to (41) is: 
 51 51 3 351 51 3 3 3
ˆˆF A P Q A P Q
r
   

 

, (42) 
where the parameters 3  and 3  are specified by  3 3, 0Q    , (18), and 51  and 51  by 
 3 51 51, 0Q    , (18). 
 
The thresholds signaling investment for a sudden unexpected withdrawal subsidy introduction 
are denoted by 
51Pˆ   and 51Qˆ  for P  and Q , respectively. The value matching condition becomes: 
 51 51 3 3 51 51 5151 51 51 3 3 3
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q A P Q K
r r r
    
  
   
  
. (43) 
The two associated smooth pasting conditions can be expressed as, respectively: 
 51 51 51 5151 51 51 51
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
PQ
P Q
A P Q
r
 



, (44) 
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 51 51 51 51 5151 51 51 51
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆˆ
PQ Q
P Q Q
A P Q
r r
  
 
 
 
. (45) 
 
There are several additional subsidy arrangements which could be modeled similarly such as 
proportional subsidies on P only, permanent, retractable, and a suddenly introduced permanent or 
retractable subsidy.  Also there are combinations of P subsidies and separate Q subsidies, and 
some arrangements such as investment credits which reduce effective K, which are also 
amendable to quasi-analytical solutions
6
.  Possibly these approaches can be utilized to model the 
consequences of tax (price) versus trading (quantities) in environmental abatement policies, see 
Pezzey and Jotzo (2012). Other arrangements such as guaranteed minimum prices for certain 
quantities, or guaranteed purchases for certain quantities at certain times, or stochastic subsidy 
amounts or proportions, or finite facilities, may not be amenable to similar quasi-analytical 
solutions.   Note that partially recoverable investment costs are conceivable, for instance in 
agricultural, educational, health and other activities, where a retractable subsidy for one type of 
activity or  crop is withdrawn, and alternative activities or crops are feasible.  Subsidies for 
operating costs (such as youth employment or imported inputs) could also be considered, as well 
as different probabilities for permanent and retractable subsidies. 
 
3.  Numerical Illustrations 
                                                 
6
 Fisher and Newell (2004) show that a subsidy per unit output equal to the price of a green certificate is equivalent 
to =s/(1-) where s is the equilibrium value of the green certificate and  is the required proportion of fossil fuel 
generation that must be purchased.  But if s is stochastic, then so is .  Lesser and Su (2008) review several feed-in-
tariff designs, noting that some US regulators have established gradually increasing annual minimum proportions of 
renewable energy that must be purchased or generated over time, but in Germany direct subsidies for renewable 
generation decrease over time. 
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It is interesting to compare the apparent effectiveness of different subsidy arrangements, and the 
possible sudden introduction or retraction of those subsidies on the real option value of those 
investment opportunities, and the price and quantity thresholds that justify commencing  
investments.  Pairs of Pˆ  and Qˆ  could be generated by changing the solutions along a suitable Q 
range.   
Since Model I Pˆ with =.20 is less than Model I Pˆ  without a subsidy (=0), clearly a permanent 
subsidy makes a difference, with a 20% R subsidy reducing the price threshold by 16.6%, and 
increasing the ROV almost 60%, as shown in Table I..   
   Table I 
 
Subsidy Incentive Effect under Different Models
 P^Q^ P^ (Q^=7.8) ROV
Model I 0.00 638.70 81.88 1022.72 NO SUBSIDY
Model I 0.20 532.25 68.24 1631.49 PERMANENT SUBSIDY ON R
 
Model II 13.65 486.07 62.32 1903.76 PERMANENT SUBSIDY ON Q
 
Model III 13.65 461.72 59.19 1717.11 RETRACTABLE SUBSIDY ON Q
 
Model IV0 13.65 718.97 92.18 1325.66 MAYBE PERMANENT SUBSIDY ON Q, R<R2^
Model IV1 13.65 697.11 89.37 1913.12 MAYBE PERMANENT SUBSIDY ON Q, R>R2^
Model V0 13.65 566.93 72.68 941.95 MAYBE RETRACTABLE SUBSIDY ON Q, R<R3^
Model V1 13.65 584.77 74.97 1127.56 MAYBE RETRACTABLE SUBSIDY ON Q, R>R3^
Q^=Q 7.80
P 53.00
R 413.4
R Subsidy 106.45 Subsidy Value at R^ M I
Q Subsidy 106.47 Subsidy Value at P^Q^ M II
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Model I is the solution to EQs 6,-7-8 with ROV EQ 10, Model II is the solution to EQs 11-12-13 with ROV EQ 3 
amended, Model III is the solution to EQs 19-20-21 with ROV EQ 17, Model IV is the solution to EQs 25-26-27 or 
30-31-32 with ROV EQ 24 or 29, Model V is the solution to EQs 38-39-40 or 43-44-45 and ROV EQ 37 or 42, all 
with also the Q function, either EQ 4 or 18, with the parameter values as follows: price P=€53, quantity Q=7.8 
KWh, R subsidy =.20, Q subsidy 13.65,  investment cost K=€4,867,0007, price volatility P=.20, quantity volatility 
Q=.20,  price and quantity correlation =-.50, P=.01, Q=.01, and riskless interest rate r=.08. =.10  reflects the 
possibility of a subsidy being withdrawn, and both the possibility of a permanent subsidy and also a retractable 
subsidy.  P^Q^ indicates the total revenue, P^ indicates the  P threshold that justifies commencing the investment, 
given that Q^=7.8. 
 
For a comparable subsidy (at the price threshold) on the quantity generated, Model II, the 
permanent subsidy reduces the price threshold even more, and adds more than 16% to the ROV.  
R is more uncertain (34.6%) than Q due to the assumed volatilities and negative correlation.  
Permanent versus Retractable Subsidies 
The lowest price threshold given Qˆ =7.8 is indicated in bold red, retractable Model III.  At P =    
€ 53 the highest ROV indicated in bold is Model II, the permanent subsidy, which would not 
provide the greatest incentive to commence investment. Commence the project when the subsidy 
is available earlier if it might be withdrawn, a “flighty bird in hand”. 
A higher retractable  results in Pˆ  increasing slightly and ROV decreasing, as shown in Figure 5 
below.  Comparing the below threshold Model IV0 (maybe permanent) with the below threshold 
Model III (retractable), the PIV0 price threshold exceeds PIII, naturally because a bird in the hand 
is worth more than the same bird in a bush (talk is cheap), and the ROV is lower.  For the above 
threshold Model IV1, the 
1
ˆ
IVP  is lower than the Model IV0, but the ROV is higher.  For sudden 
subsidies that might be withdrawn, if the current price is below threshold, 
0
ˆ
VP  is higher than the  
                                                 
7
 Some of the P, Q and K parameter values are consistent with an Iberian wind farm with a capacity of 3MW 
operating at average load factor of around 30%. The subsidy rate .20 for R in Model I is comparable with the 
Q=13.65 subsidy in Model II at the P,Q which justifies exercise of the real option. 
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ˆ
IIIP , and the ROV is lower, naturally.  An immediate retractable subsidy is a greater incentive for 
early investment than a “possible retractable” subsidy.    
Sudden possible retractable subsidies are less valuable than possible permanent subsidies, as 
retractable subsidies are less valuable than permanent subsidies.   The most valuable ROV is  
Model IV 1 (above threshold), which is the possibility of a permanent subsidy.  Governments 
seeking to sell concessions for the ROV might contemplate promising (but not yet delivering) 
future permanent subsidies. 
SENSITIVITIES
8
 
Our base parameters for the sensitivity of Pˆ  and ROV to changes in parameter values are the 
same as for Table I, over a range of Q volatility 20% to 45%, correlation of P and Q from -.50 to 
.75,  from .20 to .45 (and the comparables for Q), and  from .10 to .225, both for retractable, 
and for possible permanent and possible retractable subsidies. 
    Figure 1 
 
                                                 
8
 Complete tables are available from the authors. 
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0Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 6-7-8 without a subsidy, and 1Pˆ  with a subsidy, 2Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 11-12-
13, 
3Pˆ  
is the solution to EQs 19-20-21, 
4Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 25-26-27 or 30-31-32, 5Pˆ  is the solution 
to EQs 38-39-40 or 43-44-45 with the parameter values in Table I.     
 
Figure 2 
 
0Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 6-7-8 without a subsidy, and 1Pˆ  with a subsidy, 2Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 11-12-
13, 
3Pˆ  
is the solution to EQs 19-20-21, 
4Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 25-26-27 or 30-31-32, 5Pˆ  is the solution 
to EQs 38-39-40 or 43-44-45 with the parameter values in Table I.     
    Figure 3 
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0Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 6-7-8 without a subsidy, and 1Pˆ  with a subsidy, 2Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 11-12-
13, 
3Pˆ  
is the solution to EQs 19-20-21, 
4Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 25-26-27 or 30-31-32, 5Pˆ  is the solution 
to EQs 38-39-40 or 43-44-45 with the parameter values in Table I, except that PQ=+.50.   
  
Price thresholds for the first four  models increase with increases with quantity volatility and 
with the correlation of P and Q (Figures 1, 2, and 3).   But for Model V, incentives increase (that 
is P that justifies early investment decrease) with increases in overall volatility due to positive 
correlation, or increased quantity volatility when there is positive correlation between P and Q.  
Figure 4 shows that naturally Model 0 is not affected by changes in the size of the subsidy, but 
otherwise under all models except Model IV, increasing the subsidy provides a positive incentive 
for early investment.  But for Model IV, increasing the size of a possible permanent subsidy may 
delay early investment. So either production volume floors (quotas in IPCC, 2014) or in general 
high subsidies  might encourage early investment.   
Sensitivity to the probability of  subsidies (Figure 5) is based on certain assumptions. In our 
analysis, the  for Model III ranges from .10 to .225, but the retractable Model III  used for 
Model V is always .10.  That is there is always a .10 intensity of retraction, when the possibility 
of a retractable subsidy being introduced suddenly has an intensity ranging from .10 to .225. 
Generally the higher the probability of a possible retractable or permanent subsidy, or to the 
retraction of an existing subsidy results in an incentive to delay early investment.  
 
Figure 4 
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0Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 6-7-8 without a subsidy, and 1Pˆ  with a subsidy, 2Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 11-12-
13, 
3Pˆ  
is the solution to EQs 19-20-21, 
4Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 25-26-27 or 30-31-32, 5Pˆ  is the solution 
to EQs 38-39-40 or 43-44-45 with the parameter values in Table I. 
Figure 5 
 
3Pˆ  
is the solution to EQs 19-20-21, 
4Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 25-26-27 or 30-31-32, 5Pˆ  is the solution to 
EQs 38-39-40 or 43-44-45 with the parameter values in Table I.     
 
    Figure 6 
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45

Sensitivity of P^ to Changes in 
P^0
P^1
P^2
P^3
P^4
P^5
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
0.100 0.125 0.150 0.175 0.200 0.225

Sensitivity of P^ to Changes in 
P^3
P^4
P^5
  
29 
 
 
0Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 6-7-8 without a subsidy, and 1Pˆ  with a subsidy, 2Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 11-12-
13, 
3Pˆ  
is the solution to EQs 19-20-21, 
4Pˆ  is the solution to EQs 25-26-27 or 30-31-32, 5Pˆ  is the solution 
to EQs 38-39-40 or 43-44-45 with the parameter values in Table I.     
All price thresholds increase with increases in interest rates, as shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 7 
 
ROV0 is the solution to EQ 10 without a subsidy, ROV1 with a subsidy, ROV2 the LHS of EQ 11, ROV3 
EQ 17, ROV4 EQ 24 or 29, ROV5 EQ 37 or 42, with the parameter values in Table I.    
            Figure 8 
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ROV0 is the solution to EQ 10 without a subsidy, ROV1 with a subsidy, ROV2  EQ 3 amended, ROV3 EQ 
17, ROV4 EQ 24 or 29, ROV5 EQ 37 or 42, with the parameter values in Table 1.   
    Figure 9 
 
ROV0 is the solution to EQ 10 without a subsidy, ROV1 with a subsidy, ROV2  EQ 3 amended, ROV3 EQ 
17, ROV4 EQ 24 or 29, ROV5 EQ 37 or 42, with the parameter values in Table 1, except that PQ=+.50. 
   
    Figure 10 
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ROV0 is the solution to EQ 10 without a subsidy, ROV1 with a subsidy, ROV2  EQ 3 amended, ROV3 EQ 
17, ROV4 EQ 24 or 29, ROV5 EQ 37 or 42, with the parameter values in Table I.   
    
Figure 11 
 
ROV3 is the solution to EQ 17, ROV4 EQ 24 or 29, ROV5 EQ 37 or 42, with the parameter values in Table I. 
  
     
Figure 12 
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ROV0 is the solution to EQ 10 without a subsidy, ROV1 with a subsidy, ROV2  EQ 3 amended, ROV3 EQ 17, ROV4 
EQ 24 or 29, ROV5 EQ 37 or 42, with the parameter values in Table I.     
 
The ROV for nearly all models decrease with increases of quantity volatility (when there is 
negative correlation)  (Figure 7), and increase with increases of quantity volatility (when there is 
positive correlation) (Figure 8) and with positive correlation (Figure 9). This is due to the 
negative correlation with P acting as a kind of natural hedge against Q, resulting in lower overall 
volatility.  For positive correlation this natural hedge disappears so overall volatility increases, 
indicating a positive “vega” for these types of real options. ROV (mostly) increase with the size 
of the subsidy (Figure10). So while either production volume floors or high subsidies of any type 
might encourage investment, the value of a renewable energy concession will be dependent on 
expected volatilities, as well as the subsidy.   
Sensitivity of ROV to possible retraction or to the introduction of retractable subsidies as shown 
in Figure 11 is intuitive.  The greater the probability of retracting a subsidy, the lower the ROV, 
Model III, but the greater the possibility of a retractable subsidy (rather than no subsidy) the 
greater the ROV (Model V).  Of course, the greater the possibility of a permanent subsidy, 
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Model IV,  the greater the ROV.   Finally, the ROV decrease with an increase of  interest 
rates as shown in Figure 12, due to, among other things, the reduction of the present value of the 
eventual operating cash flows, including subsidies. 
In summary, a chief real options manager primarily interested in ROV before investment if P is 
below threshold, will seek permanent subsidies (Model II) or the possibility of permanent 
subsidies (Model IV 1), particularly if the concession is free, rather than purchased at the ROV 
from the government. A government seeking early investments, thus low price thresholds, will 
favor arrangements given by Model III, unless full value for granting the concession can be 
realized. In that case, there is a trade-off between the present value of subsidies and the current 
value of the concession. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION   
We derive the optimal investment timing and real option value for a renewable energy facility 
with joint (and sometimes distinct) products of price and quantity of generation, particularly 
where there might be a government subsidy proportional to the quantity of generation. When the 
dimensionality cannot be reduced, the thresholds and real option values are derived as a 
simultaneous solution to a set of equations.  Our base Model I shows that a permanent subsidy 
proportional to revenue lowers the investment threshold and raises the real option value 
substantially.  In Model II, when the permanent subsidy is proportional to the quantity produced, 
the threshold is lower than the equivalent R threshold of Model I. In Model III, for a retractable 
subsidy the price threshold is even lower, showing the incentive of a bird in hand. Where there is 
the possibility of a permanent subsidy, for below threshold investment options, Model IV, the 
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price threshold is much higher.  For the possibility of a retractable subsidy, Model V, the price 
threshold exceeds that for an actual retractable subsidy.  MIV0>M0>MV0>MI>MII>MIII, given 
that in all cases P< Pˆ .  Price thresholds for all models increase with increases with quantity 
volatility, and decrease with the size of the subsidy. So either production volume floors or actual 
rather than possible high subsidies of almost any type might encourage early investment. 
The order of the ROV for each context is not exactly the same as for the price threshold.  The 
ROV ranks by type of subsidy arrangement are MII>MIII>MI>MIV0>M0>MV0, given that in 
all cases P< Pˆ .  Model I shows that a permanent subsidy proportional to revenue lowers the 
threshold and raises the real option value substantially.  The highest ROV are the actual 
permanent subsidies on Q or the possibilities of such subsidies.  The lowest ROV are the 
possibilities of a retractable subsidy. The ROV for all models decrease with increases with 
quantity volatility, increase with the increase of correlation (which increases P*Q volatility) and 
increase with the size of the subsidy. So while either production volume floors or high subsidies 
of almost any type might encourage investment, the value of a renewable energy concession will 
be dependent on expected volatilities, as well as the subsidy. 
What are the apparent policy guidelines in using subsidies to encourage early investment in 
facilities with joint (and sometimes distinct) products?  Subsidies matter, especially if regarded 
as permanent.  But whether increasing a subsidy say from .20 to .45 R (or equivalent) is worth 
reducing the threshold as indicated is questionable.  Possibly less transparent incentives are price 
or quantity guarantees, which effectively reduce price and/or quantity volatility, with a 
significant impact on thresholds under all models. 
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Obvious areas for future research are other subsidy arrangements which could be modeled 
similarly, such as proportional subsidies on P only, permanent, retractable, and sudden 
permanent or retractable subsidies, along with some combinations with Q subsidy arrangement 
models. Perhaps constantly growing or shrinking subsidies can be incorporated into these 
models, along with stochastic investment costs and stochastic renewable energy certificates.  
Also possibly some of the models herein might serve as comparisons for numerical analysis of 
more realistic, finite, investment opportunities. 
Calibrating price and sometimes quantity volatilities and drifts might be feasible for some 
outputs, but calibrating the convenience yields or drifts of some quantities, correlations of price 
and quantities, and the probability of sudden provision or retraction of subsidies is likely to be a 
challenge.  Left for future research are uncertain input costs and subsidies along with 
technological developments. 
Our main contribution is in providing simplified analytical models based on gBm to compare 
results, with some that are not perhaps obvious.  Increased uncertainty in the provision or 
retraction of subsidies may not discourage early investments much, and yet increase the real 
option value of the investment opportunity. 
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Appendix 
In this Appendix, simplified analytical solutions to three alternative models are obtained by 
assuming the subsidy depends on the generated revenue and not on one of its elements.  By 
invoking the similarity principle, the value-matching relationship can be expressed as a one-
factor formulation. If the proportional subsidy is represented by M , then for revenue  R PQ , 
the total cash inflow is specified by  1 MR  . The value for the investment opportunity is 
denoted by V , in order to differentiate between the original and simplified variants.  In all 
models,  is the positive solution to the simple characteristic quadratic equation.  
Model 0 
The subsidy is set to equal zero in Model 0. If the threshold revenue signaling an optimal 
investment is denoted by 
1Rˆ , then: 
  11
1
ˆ
1
PQR K r

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The value for the investment opportunity is defined by: 
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where:          
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Model I 
For a positive proportional permanent subsidy M , the corresponding results are: 
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Model II 
The probability of a sudden unexpected withdrawal of the subsidy is denoted by  . If the 
revenue threshold signaling an optimal investment is denoted by 
3Rˆ , then its solution is found 
implicitly from: 
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where 1B  is enumerated from (A3).  The value for the investment opportunity is specified by: 
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where:    
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For 0  , when there is no likelihood of the subsidy being withdrawn unexpectedly, 3 1  and 
Model II simplifies to the Model I solution. 
Model III 
The probability of a sudden unexpected introduction of the subsidy is denoted by  . If the 
revenue threshold signaling an optimal investment is denoted by 
4Rˆ , then: 
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where 2B  is enumerated from (A6). The value for the investment opportunity is specified by: 
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where:    
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For a zero likelihood of an unexpected introduction of a proportional subsidy, Model III 
simplifies to Model 0. 
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Numerical Evaluations 
With the identical parameter values to those of Table I, the revenue thresholds are shown below.   
     
Model R 0 and Model R I results are identical to those shown in Table I, which are based on 
revenue, without and with a permanent subsidy on R.  Where there is a permanent subsidy on Q 
rather than on R, Model R II shows a higher revenue threshold than Model II, indicating an 
incentive to defer investment.  Where there is a retractable subsidy on Q rather than on R, Model 
R III shows a much higher revenue threshold than Model III, indicating a significant incentive to 
defer investment.   
 
 
 
 
 
Model R^
R 0 638.702
R I 532.251
R II 504.277
R III 721.175
